(;
GM[1]FF[4]VW[]AP[Many Faces of Go:10.0]
SZ[19]
HA[0]
ST[1]
PC[Even Game Fuseki Studies]
KM[5.5]
RE[Draw]
SO[BGJ 1, Summer 1967, Page 2]

C[Place: Even Game Fuseki Studies 

Source: BGJ 1, Summer 1967, Page 2 

Copyright British Go Association 1967, 1999 
];B[qd];W[oc]
C[White 2: When white directly attacks black 1 the best reply is
3 or A. 
]LB[ed:3][ec:A]
;B[ed]
C[Black 3: This play has the advantage of inviting white to play
at B, after which black would advance to 5. This latter play
would have the double advantage of combining a squeeze attack
on white 2 with the formation of a base for expansion in the
north west sector.  

]LB[oc:2][kc:5][cd:B]
;W[co]
C[White 4: This stone could have been played in the south east
corner instead.  
]
(;B[kc]
C[Black 5: It is advisable to play here now, whether or not white
has played at B. If white should now play in another part of
the board, this would permit black to play at 10(A), and white
would then naturally play 7(C), which would then allow black
to encircle white by playing 6, see variation.  

As to other white defences against a black play at 10, there
is also the possibility of white 12, or C may be played; and
there are still other defences not discussed here. 
]LB[od:C][pc:A][cd:B]
;W[pf]
C[White 6: With the above dangerous possibility in view, White
has chosen this play, which can be either defensive or offensive,
according to subsequent developments. The slanting formation,
2 and 6, is called "taisha" or formation of a hundred variuations
being one from which countless varieties of opening corner play
may develop. 
]LB[oc:2]
;B[od]
C[Black 7: This is a common play to sever the connection between
2 and 6. It is the most common answer to this formation. There
are two other common plays for black, one being D, the other
E. 11(G) may be considered feasible, although less common, because
of 5. 
]LB[kc:5][qe:G][pe:E][qf:D][pf:6][oc:2]
;W[nd]
C[White 8: Usually White would now place a stone at F. At this
stage of the fuseki, it is of no consequence to discuss the comparative
advantages of F and 8. 
]LB[pd:F]
;B[oe]
C[Black 9 - 11: These plays are indispensible after white 8. 
];W[pc];B[qe]
C[Black 9 - 11: These plays are indispensible after white 8. 
]LB[qe:11][pc:10][oe:9]
;W[qc]
C[White 12: White seizes the valuable 3-3 point which would otherwise
have been taken by black. 
];B[qi]
C[Black 13: By this play, black now seeks compensation in taking
territory along the east side. The last plays form a joseki that
is not played much these days.  

============================= 

Here let us review the progress of the opening up to this point.

In spite of black's initial advantage with 1 in the north east
corner, white has later occupied the all important point of 12.
Thus, as far as the corner is concerned, white has the advantage.

Black, on the other hand, has occupied territory along the east
side by his advance to 13. In size of areas, however, white's
corner is larger than black's side position.  

Next, compare the position of 5 and 6. Against black's strong
bamboo loint, 6 is practically helpless; whereas 5, although
pitted against white's entrenchment in the corner still enjoys
the advantage of possible extensions towards the north west.
Thus between 5 and 6 the scale of strength leans decidedly in
favour of black.  

]
(;W[pp]
C[White 14: A good alternative would have been G, but still in
the same corner. It is nearly always better to occupy a corner
than to make an extension along the side. In this case H or I
would not be good, because then black could reply with J or K
respectively, gaining an advantage because of the expansion of
his territory in the first case, and because of the threat of
a pressing down play at L forcing white toward the strong black
position and then making a big extension along the south side.
]LB[oq:K][qo:J][qp:I][pq:H][op:G]
;B[ep]
C[Black 15: Black here has many alternatives from which to choose;
for example, fortification at 22(A) or attacking at 16(B) would
be feasible. He has, however, here chosen 15 for the purpose
of occupying the south side towards the west.  

]LB[dq:B][cd:A]
;W[dq];B[eq]
(;W[dr]
C[White 18: White here has an alternative in M. Then black 19'
at at N, white 20' at P. This development occurs frequently and
should be remembered. 
]LB[dn:P][eo:N][dp:M]
;B[iq]
(;W[cc]
C[White 20: White plays here to reduce the black territory in this
sector.  Ordinarily, the attack on 'triangle' would be made at
22(A). In this cas e, however, black has 'square' as a valuable
outpost to the initial corner play of 'triangle'. This outpost
might also have been at Q or R. With any of these three points,
it is advisable for white to break into his opponent's position
by playing at the 3-3 point, 20.  

White now awaits, among other possibilities a counter-attack
with Black 21' at S. However this is bad, for the variation follows.
]LB[ce:S][jc:R][ic:Q][cd:A]
;B[dc]
C[Black 21: In order to avoid the developments in the variation
to move 20 above, black guards the north west side with sente
and gains much territory.  
];W[cd]
C[White 22 extends. Often Black 23' at T, white 24' at U follows;
but in this case it would leave the black position open to a
white attack at V. Black therefore finds it advisable to play
23(A) next. 
]LB[ef:A][hd:V][bf:U][de:T]
;B[ef];W[cg]
C[White 24 advances down the west side while black is building
up his territory in the north. 
];B[ne]
C[Black 25 now takes the initiative and bottles up the white group
in the corner. This is a severe blow to white.  

];W[md];B[mb];W[nb]
;B[mc];W[nc]
C[White 30: Black, by threatening to cut at 30 twice, continues
bottling up white.  

];B[ke]
C[Black 31: Black still having sente, completes his bottling up
operation and increases his territory.  

]
(;W[kq]
C[White 32: White now having sente turns to this point, which is
an offensive against the black formation and also an ambitious
extension along the south side from 14. White here had an alternative
in W.  

(At an opportune time, black may choose to attact the entire
north east position by playing X. Then the variation develops
into a ko, for the life of the white group.) 
]LB[rc:X][he:W][pp:14]
;B[qn]
C[Black 33: This has a similar purpose to that of white 32. 
];W[np]
C[White 34: A natural sequel to 33, enlarging and securing his
territory. 
];B[eh]
C[Black 35: Should black omit this play, he would still be vulnerable
to a white attack at W. Black's play therefore has a twofold
defensive significance; it defends the black territory along
the north side, and at the same time indirectly strengthens the
black group of three stones in the south west. It also serves
to apply pressure on the white formation down the west side.
thus it will be seen that 35 is a good example of a play with
triple effectiveness.  

========================= 

A rough estimate of the prospective territory reveals that black
is ahead, but the south side is not yet clarified enough to make
a proper evaluation possible as white is bound to gain a few
points in attacking the three stones in the south west, and the
two in the east as well. 
]LB[he:W]
)
(;W[kq]
(;B[rc]
C[(Sub variation to make move numbers match BGJ) 
])
(;B[rc];W[rb];B[sb];W[rd];B[sd]LB[sd:5][rd:4][sb:3][rb:2][rc:1]
)))
(;W[cc];B[ce];W[dd];B[de];W[ec];B[fc];W[fb]
(;B[fd]
C[(Black 8' could be at A). 
]LB[gc:A]
;W[gb]
C[In this case where the black outpost is at [\], B would be white's
next play in t his region; but if the black stone were at C then
9 would be white's last play in this area for the time being.
This sequence would cost black a great deal, as [\] then becomes
redundant.  

]LB[jc:C][hb:B]
)
(;B[gc])))
(;W[dp];B[eo];W[dn]))
(;W[pq];B[qo])
(;W[qp];B[oq]))
(;B[kc];W[pp]
C[[sgb: "Another part of the board" no meaning to this point.\]

];B[pc];W[od];B[pf]))
