(;
GM[1]FF[4]VW[]AP[Many Faces of Go:10.0]
SZ[19]
HA[0]
ST[1]
PB[Anon]
PW[Anon]
PC[Even Game Fuseki Studies - Part 2]
KM[5.5]
SO[BGJ 2, Autumn 1967, Page 18]

C[Copyright British Go Association 1967, 2001 
];B[qd];W[nd];B[pf]
C[Black 3: This is the usual reply to a white attack at 2, a play
not seen much now, being a defence against a white offensive
at A.  Black may, however, venture a squeeze play at B. The advisability
of such a play would be greatly increased if white C and black
D had already been played in the north-west corner, with a high
probability of a white squeeze attack at E against black D. 

If Black omits 3, White is likely to play A and occupy the corner.

 At this early stage of the opening there is little sense in
Black's playing elsewhere for the purpose of occupying another
corner.  
]LB[ic:E][ec:D][cd:C][lc:B][qc:A][nd:2]
;W[dd]
C[White 4: White may well play C instead. Such a play may serve
a good purpose; for if black should attempt an offensive by playing
D, White could profitably counter with a squeeze attack at E.
]LB[qj:F][ic:E][ec:D][cd:C]
;B[eq]
C[Black 5: This stone could have been played on any of the ordinary
initial corner positions except F. To play in the southeast corner,
however, would be questionable, as it would tend to make the
black formation unbalanced as black would have concentrated too
many stones on this side.  
]LB[qj:G][dq:F]
;W[do]
C[White 6: White might well have played in the southeast corner
instead. the play was here at 6 for the purpose of utilising
4 to form a a large territory on the west side.  
]LB[dd:4]
;B[cp];W[co]
;B[dp]
C[Black 9: This could have been played at G, see BGJ 1 page 2 move
18.  
]LB[qj:H][bp:G]
;W[eo];B[fp]
C[Black 11: Made to guard against a possible play at H, at the
same time suggesting that the next play would be around J It
has a third advantage, also, as a preparation for a daring counter
attack from 17.  
]LB[jq:J][fq:H]
;W[qo]
C[White 12' could equally well have been played at K, L or 13 (C);
but if played at 15 (D) , black would naturally take the oppressive
position L and build up a secure territory along the east side.
]LB[qj:M][oq:D][op:C][po:L][pp:K]
;B[op];W[pq];B[oq];W[pr]
(;B[dk]
C[Black 17: This Black initiative shatters White's ambitions along
the west side. A black play of 17' at M (following the joseki)
would have been wrong, for then 18' at N or P would be too good.
Black may well have played this stone lower, at P. Should White
then extend his three stone wall black would secure a double
advantage with 19' at 18 or Q, dominating the whole of the west
side and likewise attacking the white stone 4.  Let us here speculate
on White's possible response to 17...  
]LB[cf:Q][ck:P][bk:N][kq:M]
;W[cg];B[fl];W[gn];B[ip];W[hm];B[hk];W[jc];B[qm])
(;B[dk]
(;W[gn];B[cf]
C[Should White extend his wall by 2, Black would immediately seize
the all-important point 3, and occupy the west side. White would
thus play right into Black's hands.  
]LB[cf:3][gn:2][dk:1]
)
(;W[ci]
C[Suppose White should make a squeeze attack with 1, 
];B[gn]
C[Black would launch an encircling movement with 2.  
];W[el]
C[White would then accept the challenge and try to break the seige
with 3. A running encounter would then ensue.with 4 thru 9. 
];B[ek];W[fl];B[fk];W[gl];B[gk];W[hl]
;B[dl]
C[Then Black would shift the line of attack, and by playing 10
attempt to cut the white formation in two, 
];W[fn]
C[...which White would then guard against by 11.  Examine carefully
the resulting formation at this point. Note what would be the
position of 1. The black formation would be strongly entrenched
with 4-6-8-10. White's 1 would be dangerously close to the black
entrenchment and also too far from its ally at 'triangle'. Thus
it will be easily seen that 1 would have been played unwisely.
]LB[fn:11][dl:10][hl:9][gk:8][gl:7][fk:6][fl:5][ek:4][el:3][gn:2][ci:1]
)))
