

Trigantius XXIV
The 2000 Cambridge Go Tournament
sponsored by Hitachi

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Trigantius Go Tournament 2000

The 24th Trigantius Go Tournament was held in the Centre at St.Paul's Church on Hills Road, Cambridge, on Saturday 4 March 2000. Organiser was Matthew Woodcraft, assisted by Tim Hunt, Jonathan Medlock, Matthew Reid, and Duncan Richer. Full details of the results and prizewinners may be found in the centrefold.

Continued sponsorship from Hitachi Europe made possible the prize fund, of £240 this year.

The Cambridge Go Society would like to thank the BGA for its entry form and advance publicity service, equipment, and the attendance of the bookstall. Also Lois Robson of the Centre staff for her help.


It is not yet decided whether the event should next year return to the University Centre, which would allow a Sunday date. Please send any comments about this to Charles Matthews (charles@sabaki.demon.co.uk).

Booklet Editor: Charles Matthews. Booklet set in Pagemaker with Gofigs.


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Vision in Fighting


This year's booklet was well supported, with 35 game records contributed in all, mostly emailed a few days after the tournament. The Editor is very grateful for the co-operation of those who took this trouble, even if there was no space to include something from each game. The majority of these games were from the *kyu* players. The first half of the publication reflects that preponderance. It consists of key moments from the middlegame. The emphasis is on perception in the fighting, rather than reading. These are snapshots from games, meant to capture some of the more accessible insights of Seong-June Kim.




Black 1 here is very good. White has no choice about answering at 2; and Black can continue to attack the White stones on the right. The question is how. The natural local sequence is Black A, White B and Black C.




Black should shut off the lower side before pressing the attack. Black 3 (or A) are good. In the game Black played B, which allows White out at A. Attacking from the direction of C relies too much on the top framework, which has defects at the 'x' points.




White has just invaded the right side. Black can fight strongly in the centre; White's play at A isn't a serious threat. Black should cap at 1. White 2 is natural to move the weak groups apart; then Black 3 menaces the left side.




In the game Black made a direct attack on the stone in the lower right. Up to 24 the result isn't good, with Black's key cutting stones being swallowed up in the centre. The weak points marked 'x' remain, giving White a chance to reduce the territory Black has taken.




Black attacks White's eye shape directly with 1. There are two things wrong with this play. It is a bit loose in itself, so that Black had to spend time defending it. And as long as White doesn't die it is hard to see how Black can take profit from this direction.




This way of attacking is more attractive. Black 1 is a shape verging on an overplay, in most positions. Here it works well if White pushes through. Black has a convincing attack on the upper group, and is solid lower left.




In this position Black to play ought to expand the top framework with 1. Next Black A, B or C on the left would be good, and White's shoulderhit at D comes under attack with Black E. Black threatens F, so White needs 2.




In the game Black chose the wrong direction, with 1 in this diagram. That gave White a chance to come out with 2; but the play chosen was an overplay (it should have been at 5). When Black cut through with 3, White was in serious trouble.




Black 1, from the game, succeeded in starting a running fight in the lower right, involving the white stones to the left of it also. However Black didn't derive any great advantage from it.




The key point is in fact far way from that area. Black 1 makes thick shape, and after it White really needs to defend at 2. Then Black plays on the large scale at 3. This is a pivotal point for frameworks. If Black also is able to play at A, a very large central area will appear.




Black 1, from the game, perhaps doesn't achieve very much. In fact the exchange of 1 for 2 probably favours White. The question is, how to play this position? Black has slim chance of taking serious profit on the right.




Black 1 here would help the lower left corner, and has a probing function too. If White 2 is as shown, the peep Black 3 leads onto a promising cross-cut with 5 and 7. White might instead play 2 at 3, conceding points on the edge. Then Black could jump to A, since the white group below is weak.




Roger Daniel on the attack once more. White 1 is in line with the roundabout (*motare*) theory. But Black 2 is big; and since Black has further good plays at A, B and C, the attack seems to have fizzled out.




The territorial play White 1 would be good here. Suppose Black plays 2 for good shape. Then White can continue with 3 and 5. Since the black group in the centre is still not settled, this is interesting for White. There may be further profit on the way, on the left side.




White managed to scrape life together for a very deep invasion in this game. Black probably goes wrong at 12; cutting at A to take the side is very large, and White would still be weak in the centre.




There was however an earlier moment when perception might apply. Black 1 here should make it harder for White to develop. In any case Black should imagine a Black stone in place at A. This would threaten to shut White in along the lower edge, and counts as “almost *sente*”.




The dodging play White 3 is useful in some contexts; but this is the wrong occasion. Black's attack is nearly ideal (interpolate Black A, White B before connecting at 12 to win the cigar). White ends up in trouble.




White ought in this case to seek life with the plays A and B. One reason is that the area to the left has a number of defects, represented by the 'x' points. The logic of go suggests that you invite your opponent to take territory in such places, where you have good endgame possibilities.




Two incidents showing Black missing the significant points on the left side of the board. Here Black 1 is the wrong direction (should be near A): little effect on White at the top since the triangled stone is a tight play.




Later Black was trailing in the game, and needed something special from fighting in the centre. Black 1 here would have been a last chance to dream up a double attack on the white groups to left and right. As it was, Black went quietly with Black A, White B, Black C, White D.




There is an overall problem with the way White played here, exemplified by White 1 (rather than White A, Black B, White C, probably answered by Black D), a 50% play. White is coasting; but the score doesn't justify this.




White must at least set out to attack Black's reduction play (12 above). White 1 here starts a fightback. Next A, B or C would be good for White, and leave Black work to do to live in the centre. If Black D, White E; certainly a loss of a few points, but there is no future in passive play.




White in this position needed to recoup some serious losses in the lower right. Therefore Black 4 setting up a *ko* fight was ill-advised. One thing White has in abundance is *ko* threats.



It would have shown much better judgement for Black to play 2 in this diagram instead. The territorial loss is in fact quite small. It appears that White needs another play to settle the top right group, or else it might lose its eye shape; and Black could turn his attention to the rest of the board.



White played 1, presumably thinking it was a key shape point. However the result wasn't good up to 6 (and White didn't improve matters by playing to save 1, which became a weak group of non-cutting stones).



There is a shape consideration here, but hidden more deeply. White should play the *hane*-connect 1 and 3 immediately. There is a danger that this sequence may become Black's *sente* after Black A, White B, Black C, White D. Then up to 7 is expected. (White E, Black F should be played.)

Results of Trigantius Go Tournament, March 4th, 2000

The 2000 Trigantius Tournament was held on Saturday 4th March 2000 in St. Paul's Church on Hills Road, Cambridge. There were three rounds with time limits one hour each, plus overtime of 25 plays in five minutes. *Komi* was six points.


The cash prize for overall winner was shared by Seong-June Kim, Francis Roads, Alistair Wall, and David Ward. The cash prize for best *kyu* player was shared by Geoff Kaniuk, Wenbo Mao, and Mike Nash. Prizes for three or 2.5 wins went to: David Ward, Paul Russell, Roger Murby, William Brooks, David Firth, Jonathan Medlock, Martin Cook and Simon Jones. The 13x13 prize was won by Shawn Hearn.

Posn	No	Name	Grade	Club	1	2	3	Wins	MMS
1=	1	Seong-June Kim	6D	Cambridge	6+	2+	3	2	5
	2	Francis Roads	4D	Wanstead	7+	1-	8+	2	5
	3	Alistair Wall	4D	Wanstead	5+	8-	1+	2	5
	4	David Ward	3D	Cambridge	9+	6+	11+	3	5
5=	5	Y K Kim	5D	CLGC	3-	7-	10+	1	4
	6	Des Cann	4D	Leamington	1-	4-	12+	1	4
	7	T Mark Hall	4D	Bristol	2-	5+	-	1	4
	8	Charles Matthews	3D	Cambridge	10+	3+	2-	2	4
9=	9	Andrew Grant	3D	OU	4	12-	19+	1	3
	10	Toby Manning	3D	Leamington	8-	13+	5-	1	3
	11	Tony Atkins	2D	Reading	14+	17+	4-	2	3
	12	John Fairbairn	2D	CLGC	19+	9+	6-	2	3
	13	Simon Goss	2D	Bracknell	15+	10-	16+	2	3
	14	Alan Thornton	2D	St Albans	11-	21+	15+	2	3
15=	15	Michael Charles	2D	St Albans	13-	26+	14-	1	2
	16	Baron Allday	1D	West Wales	18+	19+	13-	2	2
	17	Jonathan Chin	1D	Cambridge	23+	11-	21+	2	2
	18	Tim Hunt	1D	Cambridge	16-	30+	22+	2	2
19=	19	Dan Micsa	2D	Reading	12-	16-	9-	0	1
	20	John Mcanally	1D	Manchester	21-	22-	26+	1	1
	21	Gerry Mills	1D	Monmouth	20+	14-	17-	1	1
	22	Geoff Kaniuk	1K	CLGC	24+	20+	18-	2	1
	23	Wenbo Mao	1K	Bristol	17-	31+	32+	2	1
	24	Mike Nash	1K	NLGC	22-	27+	28+	2	1
25=	25	Steve Bailey	1K	West Surrey	28-	35-	33+	1	0
	26	Konrad Scheffler	1K	Cambridge	31+	15-	20-	1	0
	27	Edward Blockley	2K	Worcester	35+	24-	37+	2	0
	28	Martin Harvey	2K	Manchester	25+	29+	24-	2	0
	29	Fred Holroyd	2K	OU	34+	28-	35+	2	0
	30	Matthew Reid	2K	Cambridge	36+	18-	31+	2	0
31=	31	Helen Harvey	1K	Manchester	26-	23-	30-	0	-1
	32	Phil Beck	2K	Cambridge	33+	-	23-	1	-1
	33	John Lowe	2K	Leamington	32-	39+	25-	1	-1
	34	Howard Manning	2K	Edinburgh	29-	37-	38+	1	-1


35	Sue Patterson	2K	CLGC	27-	25+	29-	1	-1
36	Roger Daniel	3K	Hampstead	30-	49+	39+	2	-1
37	Bill Streeten	3K	Billericay	41+	34+	27-	2	-1
38	Thomas Blockley	3K	Worcester	39-	40+	34-	1	-2
39	Frank Visser	3K	Cambridge	38+	33-	36-	1	-2
40	Robert Jack	4K	Cambridge	42+	38-	43+	2	-2
41	Jimmy Mao	4K	Bristol	37-	45+	50+	2	-2
42	David Hall	4K	Bracknell	40-	43-	46+	1	-3
43	Neil Masson	5K	Ipswich	47+	42+	40-	2	-3
44	Paul Russell	6K	Cambridge	52+	47+	45+	3	-3
45	Ron Bell	5K	Reading	46+	41-	44-	1	-4
46	Paul Brennan	5K	SE Wales	45-	48+	42-	1	-4
47	Malcolm Hagan	5K	Portsmouth	43-	44-	49+	1	-4
48	Richard Mullens	5K	St Albans	49-	46-	53+	1	-4
49	Vince Suttle	5K	Ipswich	48+	36-	47-	1	-4
50	Laurent Chane	6K	Cambridge	53+	52+	41-	2	-4
51	Roger Murby	8K	Cambridge	56+	53+	52+	3	-5
52	Roger Peck	6K	-	44-	50-	51-	0	-6
53	Jose F Santiago	6K	OU	50-	51-	48-	0	-6
54	William Brooks	9K	Cambridge	55=	56+	59+	2.5	-6.5
55	David Firth	10K	Leamington	54=	57+	56+	2.5	-7.5
56	Andrea Casalotti	8K	-	51-	54-	55-	0	-8
57	Ian Mcanally	11K	Manchester	61+	55-	62+	2	-9
58	Joe Walker	11K	-	59-	60-	61+	1	-10
59	Shawn Hearn	12K	Berks Youth	58+	61+	54-	2	-10
60	Jonathan Medlock	13K	Cambridge	67+	58+	63+	3	-10
61	Roland Halliwell	11K	Epsom	57-	59-	58-	0	-11
62	Duncan Richer	13K	Cambridge	66+	64+	57-	2	-11
63	David Gordon	13K	CLGC	64-	66+	60-	1	-12
64	Nicola Hurden	13K	Berks Youth	63+	62-	65-	1	-12
65	Hoi Ping Mok	14K	Cambridge	-	68+	64+	2	-12
66	Pauline Bailey	13K	West Surrey	62-	63-	69-	0	-13
67	Bill Barnett	15K	-	60-	69-	68-	0	-15
68	Garry White	16K	Berks Youth	69-	65-	67+	1	-15
69	Martin Cook	19K	York	68+	67+	66+	3	-16
70	Simon Jones	19K	Berks Youth	71+	72+	73+	3	-16
71	Andrew Clarke	20K	Ipswich	70-	73+	72+	2	-18
72	Paul Blockley	25K	Worcester	73-	70-	71-	0	-25
73	Andrew Mcanally	30K	Manchester	72+	71-	70-	1	-29

The One-Point High Approach in Practice


In a surprising number of the games sent in, the one-point high approach to the 4-4 point was seen, suggesting a degree of fashionability.




This play can almost always be met with the one-point jump answer shown in the left-hand diagram. After that the 3-3 invasion of the right-hand diagram isn't particularly recommended. The outcome is that White makes good shape on the outside after 6. This result is anyway clearly better for White than in the case of the ordinary approach (move the triangle stone to the point 6). For that reason alone the one-point high approach is regarded as a special plan.




From Wall-Matthews. In this case the game has started on a very large scale. Black 1 is appropriate, since the intention is to play 3 next.




From Blockley-Jack. Here White 1 isn't best. White should play at A. Black has twice played on the third line, so that White needn't fear a framework contest. Once 1 is played, jumping out to B is urgent.




If White really is concerned to reduce Black's framework, this is the way to play. The combination of the capping play at 1 and the invasion at 3 is perfect for White. Therefore Black should resist, with Black 2 at A, then White B, and Black cross-cut at C for an early fight.




White had a poor result in the lower left. Then Black came into the top right with the same one-point high approach. Again this isn't particularly appropriate. Next White played A, loose shape; at B or C would be better.




Black had taken a large territory in the lower left, so Black 1 here would be reasonable to take an overall lead. Perhaps Black disliked suffering the diagonal attachment 2; but having one weak group isn't so serious. After 7 Black A makes good eye shape. However the key area is Black B etc.



Daniel-Suttle: Black 1 suits Roger Daniel's consistent centre-oriented style. Black 5 should be A, a good shape if White pushes along the second line at the top. Black 17 should be B first, before operations on the right side.




Patterson-Bailey: Here White 1 works out well. White gets a balanced formation, while Black's corner suffers from bad *aji*. After a White play at A White could extend next to C or up the side. White B or C might be possible, and White D will usually merit an answer from Black.




This eight-question quiz is taken from the game Kaniuk-Hunt, which featured some interesting fighting. Black does well initially (34 is at 23).


Q1: Should Black now connect with A or B? (Solution p.26.)




Q2: Should White now play A or B? (Solution p.26.)




Q3: Should Black now play A or B? (Solution p.27.)




Q4: Should Black now play *atari* at A or B? (Solution p.27.)




Q5: Should White play at A or B? (Solution p.28.)





Q6: Should Black play at A or B? (Solution p.28.)





Q7: (Black 13 at 6) Should Black play at A or B? (Solution p.29.)





Q8: Should Black play at A or B? (Solution p.29.)





Q3: A is correct. Normally the bulge shape (**right**) has more to be said for it than the solid connection (**left**). But this case is exceptional; the many triangled white stones mean that Black must concentrate on safety.





Q4: A is correct. It is better to play the sacrifice line (**left**). There is something more for Black here after White 8 (see inside cover problem). (**Right**) This is the continuation from the game. Black's group is weak and rather heavy, so it would have been better to give something up here.





Q5: A is correct. White 1 (left) makes good defensive shape. The cutting point at C troubles Black, while Black D, White E would weaken the lower Black group. (Right) The bamboo joint 1 is firm on the edge, but slack.



Q6: A is correct. Simply jumping out (left) is the best solution to Black's problems. (Right) Black 1 and so on have the disadvantage of making White solid, while requiring an extra play from Black to complete the shape.




Q7: B is correct. Black 1 (left) covers the cutting point at C, and then Black 3 prepares to attack by building up the weak group. White C up to Black L will follow. (Right) Once White cuts at 4 here Black can do little.




Q8: B is correct. Black 1 (left) makes the best of a bad job. Black may have a chance to play C etc. later to attack White's eye shape. (Right) As played in the game; the cut 'x' has become serious. In fact White ran out an easy winner, because of the fight on the right side studied here.

This commentary combines written notes sent by Francis Roads (4 *dan*), White in the game and one of the prizewinners, with contrasting observations of Seong-June Kim (6 *dan*), another prizewinner. It concentrates on the first half of the game Hall-Roads from Round 1, and the delicate business of running fight and competing frameworks, rather than the shenanigans after move 100.



(1-50) Roads: I'm well known for playing the 1-3-5 opening as Black; but of course I know how to attack it too. White 16 is too early, really, to start this fight. Kim: 16 is OK. Roads: Black can play the large 19, 21 at once.




Kim: Black 23 could be one line further. This choice of extension for Black reflects the possibility of Black A, White B, Black C with a threat to the corner.


Roads: I thought Black 27 defended the wrong group. Kim: Black's result is adequate. If he played on the lower side White might not answer.

Roads: 29 seems to force me to make good shape. Kim: 29, 31 are a bit heavy. The simple one-point jump out is better shape: we see 42 later.


Roads: At 32 I'm not worried about the left-hand group: it can jump ahead. Kim: White 36 is conservative. White at A is possible (see next page).




There is really no danger for White in this position of Black pushing in at 2, so long as White can play the exchange of 3 for 4. Then White running back at 5 turns Black 2 into a bad play.



Roads: White 36 is good shape, I think. There is no danger of the double peep. Black 41 strengthens the thin 5-35 extension. Kim: 41 is good. Roads: At 42, Black could play this other way. He can live on the edge, but some stones are cut off in the centre. I thought he would prefer this line. As it is I strengthen my lower territory nicely. White 48: T. Mark thought this was *aji keshi*. I thought it was a good forcing move, helping my group's eye shape. Kim: White 50 should be at B.




(51-100) Roads: Black 1 is the *sake* bottle shape, to be avoided if possible. Kim: I question White's direction. After Black 3 there is no way to make a large corner, and the 3-3 point is still open. I dislike White 6, which makes Black 100% alive. Roads: 6 is a probe. I'm trying to take profit.



Kim: At White 12, Black should play this way, to take territory and *sente*. [Hall and Roads thought so too.] Something like the diagram should occur, at which point Black should invade the lower right 3-3 point. At 22 Black is still ahead, but White has caught up.

Roads: I wasn't certain that I would keep *sente* by playing at 25 before Black could; but my opponent said I would have.

Kim: White should have played at A before 26. This probe affects the life-and-death of the corner, or the endgame, according to Black's answer. White 30 is only a 50% play (should be 31). Black 33 must be the 3-3 point; this is too soft and Black is already alive outside. Black 43 is good.



(101-140) In *ko* at 1 or 4: 7, 10, 13, 30, 33, 36, 38.

Roads: I failed to understand 1, which is in fact the beginning of an evil plot. Kim: White 2 should be 29, in which case Black has nothing here. Roads: White 14 isn't a *ko* threat, but a big territorial move. Black 15 and so on is the evil sequence I should have seen, and which reduces my corner to *seki* in *sente*. At 29 the *ko* has become easy for Black. White 40 cut off the stones. [That isn't clear from the record, which ends here, but proved decisive. This can be treated as a reading exercise. In any case the exact position of Black 45 of the last figure matters greatly.]